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Party Competition in Illinois:
Republican Prospects in a Blue State
Introduction
Campaigns and elections in Illinois are always interesting and exciting spectacles. They
are full of colorful characters, great plots, and unexpected twists to the story line. Each election
brings new characters and different stories, but each builds on the rich tradition and culture of
a big and diverse state which takes its politics and politicians quite seriously. A state which over
the last half century has produced such notables as Everett Dirksen, Paul Douglas, Adlai
Stevenson, Jr., Charles Percy, Paul Simon, Alan Dixon, Richard Ogilvie, Dan Walker, Dan
Rostenkowski, Richard J. Daley, Harold Washington, Richard M. Daley, Russell Arrington, Phil
Rock, Michael Madigan, Pate Phillip, Roland Burris, George Ryan, Jim Edgar, Jim Thompson,
Richard Durbin, Barack Obama, Emil Jones, Judy Barr Topinka, and Rod Blagojevich clearly has a
great political culture and a compelling political history. We have had our scoundrels and some
have ended up in federal prison. We have had our statesmen of the past and some of our
present leaders hold national office with great prominence and prospects for national
leadership.
One of the reasons Illinois politics and government is always so interesting is the fact
that the two parties, at least over the long term, have faced each other from a fairly even
statewide base. Each party has experienced the ups and downs that go with the electoral tides
of the moment, and each has been dominant and each disadvantaged for some period of time.
Illinois has been a competitive state for decades; however, from the 1940s through the 1980s
the Republicans held a consistent advantage if one judges by control of the majority in the
General Assembly. Also, from 1976 through 2002 the Republicans won every race for Governor
and controlled the executive mansion for 26 consecutive years. After the 2002 state elections
the Democrats took control of the entire government, riding a tide of electoral success which
swept the governor’s race and all the constitutional offices, except for the State Treasurer. Just
as importantly, the
Democrats for the first time since 1992 took control of the majority in both the Illinois
House and the Illinois Senate. This was the first time since the brief two year interval of 1975‐
1976, when Dan Walker was governor, that the Democrats had control of both the executive
and the legislative branches or had a unified government under their control. Before that brief
interlude, one had to go back to the New Deal Era of 1933 through 1940, when Henry Horner
was Governor for almost two terms, to find another comparable lengthy era of unified
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government under the Democrats (Howard, 1999, 239‐246). After the 2002 Democratic sweep,
there was much political commentary about how the Republicans were facing hard times in
Illinois and entering a rebuilding era. Then in 2006 the plight of the Republicans got even
worse. That year, Governor Rod Blagojevich was handily re‐elected over the Republican State
Treasurer, Judy Barr Topinka. The Democrats held onto their majority in the Illinois House and
increased their majority in the Illinois State Senate. The Democrats also swept all the state
constitutional office races, including the State Treasurer, which prior to 2006 had been the only
statewide office still held by the Republicans. The Democrats had owned both U. S. Senate
seats since 2004 when Democrat Barack Obama replaced former Senator Peter Fitzgerald. In
fact, Obama won that race in a landslide against the hapless Alan Keyes who the Republicans
had imported from Maryland to run against Obama at the last minute (Jackson, 2006). It was
only at the level of the U. S. House results for 2006 that the Republicans could take any real
solace. There their former 10 to 9 advantage in House seats had been reversed in 2004 when
veteran Republican Phil Crane had been upset by Melissa Bean. The Democrats maintained
that 10 to 9 advantage after the 2006 elections. This very closely divided and narrow majority
enjoyed by the Democrats statewide in the U. S. House distribution contains an important
lesson. The overall competitiveness of the two parties statewide is indicated by these
geographically based results and it extends beyond the usual redistricting truth that the map is
often drawn to protect incumbents first and the party in power second. Republicans have been
competitive, and at times even dominant statewide in the past, and there are some indicators
in this paper as to how and where they can regain their competitiveness in the future.
Lessons from Voting Behavior Research
Most of the empirical evidence provided in this paper will focus on aggregate data
assembled at the county and statewide level. It is useful to start this analysis with explicit
recognition that all aggregate voting returns are made up of individual voters and the discipline
of Political Science has developed an extensive base of knowledge about how those individuals
behave politically. One of the cardinal rules of voting behavior is that partisanship counts for a
lot and is very important in explaining why elections turn out as they do. Voters come in a
variety of partisan forms ranging from strong partisans to weak partisans to independents. The
strong partisans vote routinely and very heavily for their own party’s nominees up and down
the ticket. The only question about them is whether they will be motivated by the candidates,
the issues, and the campaigns to turn out to vote in a particular election, and usually they do so
at rates much higher than the weak partisans and the independents. Very few strong partisans
defect to the other party in any one election although they may stay home if there is something
particularly egregious about the party’s ticket or its recent record. The weak partisans are not
nearly as loyal and they have a much greater propensity to split their tickets and to defect to
the other party. They are also harder to motivate and to persuade to turn out on election day.
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The weak partisans must be motivated and mobilized in order to help contribute to building the
party’s electoral coalition into a winning majority. The strong and weak partisans together can
drive the building toward an electoral majority; however, neither major party is strong enough
in Illinois, or nationally, to depend entirely on their own partisans to win a majority in most
elections. Only at the local level, in some one party dominant geographic jurisdictions can one
build an electoral majority out of only the party’s own strong partisans.
It is clear that on the crucial variable of party identification the Democrats have enjoyed
an advantage statewide recently. Public opinion polls have consistently showed that the
Democrats lead the Republicans by a comfortable margin in Illinois. For example, a Survey U S
A poll conducted in July of 2006 showed the Democrats at 43 percent, the Republicans at 32
percent, and the Independents at 23 percent in Illinois (Reported in Miller, Capital Fax, July 28,
2006). Two months later, in September, a Chicago Tribune poll found the Democrats at 43
percent; the Republicans at 25 percent, and the Independents at 22 percent (Chicago Tribune,
September 12, 2006). These results indicate that from two‐thirds to three fourths of Illinois
voters identify with one of the two major parties which is a rate of partisanship somewhat
higher than the national averages and which is another indicator of a very partisan and a very
competitive state although it is one with a Democratic advantage at this point. For comparison
a Gallup poll taken in late January of 2007 showed that the national distribution of partisans
was 34 percent Democrats, 30 percent Republicans, and 34 percent Independents (Gallup,
2007).
This analysis also identifies a third and sizable group of voters who are not strong or
weak party supporters and who can be appealed to on the basis of the issues and the
candidates presented in a particular race. These are the Independents who reject party labels
and party loyalty for whatever combination of reasons. They tend to split their tickets more
and they are up for grabs as they swing back and forth in the party and candidates they support
from election to election. Actually the empirical research shows that there are two basic types
of Independents. One group is the true Independents, i.e. those who have absolutely no
allegiance to either major party and no sense of attachment to either and who actively reject
such attachments. They may truly “vote the person and not the party” as the popular phrase
goes. Other independents may overtly reject taking the party label for themselves and may not
psychologically identify with either party; however, in a behavioral sense they predominantly
support one party over the other. These are what the scholars call “independent‐leaners” who
rather consistently support one party over the other while rejecting the party label (Keith, et al.,
1992) As Keith and his associates showed in their research, this variant of the Independents
acts in the voting booth much like the weak partisans of the party they lean toward. They are
harder to turn out at the polls and they are more disengaged in politics than the strong
partisans; however, when they vote, they are likely to be pretty consistent supporters of one
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party. This leaves a much smaller group of “true Independents” as the most likely to split their
tickets and to change their partisan vote from election to election, or to not vote at all, or to be
attracted to third party candidates.
It is the thesis of this paper that the two parties have a very strong foundation in
different geographical sections of Illinois and in the very different social strata, individuals and
interest groups which make up the polity and society of this diverse state. The parties
represent different people, different classes, different groups and interests, and they articulate
different stands on the major issues of the day. The Democrats and the Republicans have many
long time loyal supporters and well defined geographical bases in Illinois, and they fall back to
those foundations to regroup and rebuild in times of hardship and challenge. That is essentially
what is happening to the Republicans in the first decade of the 21st Century. The ability to
rebuild, expand and prosper is contingent on reaching new audiences, new voters, and
mobilizing them, and in some limited instances, the conversion of other voters and groups
traditionally identified with the other party. The new voters and the Independents, however,
are the major source of new blood and new support. Each party knows that this strategic
challenge faces them and what they must do to adapt and survive in an ever‐changing
environment. Each tries to make the adaptations necessary to adjust to an ever changing
environment; however, they use their base, their foundation from the past, which is anchored
in many years of electoral history to provide them the foundation and the stability to build on
for the future.
Blue States and Red States
There is a great deal of discussion in American politics today about the blue states and
the red states (White, 2003; Williams, 1997, Fiorina, 2005). These designations were originally
made by the television networks as they reported the presidential election returns and filled in
their massive maps of the United States with the assigned color as each state’s probable
electoral college vote winners were announced. This graphic was initially designed to add color
and visual excitement to the reporting of the election returns, but it has become a universal
shorthand for summarizing the politics of a divided and polarized nation. That polarization is
almost always depicted at the state level with each state now given an automatic color coded
category, red for the Republicans and blue for the Democrats. This convenient shorthand has
become a powerful way to summarize a number of important trends in American politics.
Illinois is a large and diverse state and a prize well worth winning in national politics. It
has long been regarded as one of the “bellwether” states, or a state with a very diverse
population and economy and one which indicated quite accurately which way the political
winds were blowing. Recently the Associated Press used U. S. Census Bureau data to rank all
fifty states. Illinois was ranked the most representative, or “most average” state in the union
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on a wide variety of demographic indicators (Ohlemacher, The Southern Illinoisan, May 17,
2007, 1). On that count then, the prospects for the Democrats look promising nationally to the
extent that Illinois is a representative state politically. Illinois has been designated a blue state
consistently for well over a decade. Russell Working of the Chicago Tribune looking at the
national electoral map in November of 2004 called Illinois “a blue island in a red sea” (Working,
Chicago Tribune, November 8, 2004, 1). Veteran Illinois politics observer, Paul Green has
termed Illinois, “…a solid deep blue Democratic Party bastion” (Green, February 12, 2007). This
Democratic trend probably began with Bill Clinton’s electoral victories in Illinois in both 1992
and 1996, and it has become an accurate presidential election characterization. The Democrats
have won four consecutive presidential elections in Illinois since 1992. However, at the state
level in the 1990s Illinois was a closely divided state where the Democrats and the Republicans
both had significant strength and did very well in other statewide election results. As we saw
earlier the Republicans won every governor’s election between 1976 and 2002, and they often
won by comfortable statewide margins. By virtue of having won the right to draw the
redistricting map in 1991, the Republicans captured the majority in the senate for each election
between 1992 and 2002. The Illinois congressional delegation was about as equally divided as
one could get with a 10 to 10 tie in the delegation between 1992 and 2002. In 2002 the Illinois
delegation became 10 Republicans and 9 Democrats, and it became 10 Democrats and 9
Republicans in 2004. The U. S. Senate count was 2 Democrats and 0 Republicans during most
of the 1990s; with Paul Simon and Alan Dixon, and then Paul Simon and Carol Moseley Braun
holding those seats; however, it became a 1 to 1 tie after Peter Fitzgerald defeated Carol
Moseley Braun in 1998. In short the decade of the 1990s was marked by a very competitive and
very divided government era in Illinois history. Outside the presidential election returns, Illinois
was best described as a checkered or striped state with streaks and spots of blue intermittently
interrupting the red. Indeed, for generations Illinois consistently had been ranked by political
scientists as one of the most competitive states (Ranney, 1965, 87; Bibby and Holbrook, 2003,
88). This change represents movement from a slightly pro‐Republican tilt to the very
competitive range The question this paper explores is one of just how competitive Illinois will
be in the future in the perennial competition between Democrats and Republicans and where
do the Republicans have realistic prospects for winning locally and building on local strength to
make a comeback statewide.
The Historic Context: The Elections of 1998, 2002, and 2006
The empirical data which undergird this paper are aggregate voting statistics presented
at the statewide and at the county level of analysis. The county voting returns are the primary
unit of analysis. The data for the 102 counties in Illinois were gathered initially by the Illinois
State Board of Elections, and this paper makes use of their voting returns for the elections of
1998, 2002, and 2006. The major focus is on the Governor’s race for those years with an
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additional look at the race for Attorney General. We are grateful to the Illinois State Board of
Elections for the provision of these data. A brief review of each of those races is provided for
the political context of the race and the time.
The year 1998 presented a rare open seat contest for Governor since Governor Jim
Edgar was retiring after eight years in office. The 1998 race for Governor featured then
Secretary of State and veteran office holder, George Ryan, the Republican candidate, versus
Glenn Poshard who was a five‐term Democratic Congressman from Marion in deep southern
Illinois. Ryan was from Kankakee in northeastern Illinois, and he had been Lieutenant Governor
under Governor Jim Thompson, and then more recently had been elected twice to be Secretary
of State. In Illinois the Office of Secretary of State is a powerful one because among other
things it controls thousands of jobs in driver’s license facilities and other state agencies. Those
jobs often go to the party faithful and are highly coveted jobs. Over many years in the Illinois
General Assembly, the Lieutenant Governor’s Office, and in the Secretary of State’s Office,
George Ryan had built a reputation as a capable and ambitious politician. He was particularly
liked and respected by the professionals in Springfield because he enjoyed the give and take of
the political process and was an effective builder of legislative coalitions and log‐roller for the
causes and bills he supported.
Congressman Glenn Poshard was a former State Senator and educator who was highly
popular in his district and throughout the southern Illinois region. Poshard was particularly well
regarded in labor union circles because of his voting record in the Congress. Poshard was a
strong and energetic campaigner and an eloquent speaker on the stump and he had a proven
track record as a vote‐getter in his region; however, candidates from southern Illinois have a
difficult time winning state‐wide office since it is a rural region and the population base is much
smaller than that in central and northeastern Illinois. Poshard had also survived a hard‐fought
and spirited Democratic primary against three other strong candidates and two minor
challengers while Ryan had only one minor challenger in the primary. Poshard had been an
outspoken critic of the prevailing campaign finance system in Illinois. Poshard promised to
continue his self‐imposed ban on taking campaign money from political action committees
although he did take money from labor unions and other Democratic Party sources. This made
it difficult for Poshard to compete in the money game, and Poshard was outspent by Ryan by a
margin of $14.5 million to $4.5 million (Howard, 1999, 352).
Each candidate was an experienced and capable politician who had enjoyed success in
prior races and it shaped up as a very competitive general election race. After a hard‐fought
contest, Ryan ultimately prevailed; however, it was not by a wide margin. Ryan received 51
percent of the statewide vote and Poshard received 48 percent, which was much closer than
many of the public opinion polls had predicted. Poshard ran as close as he did because of his
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extraordinary level of support in southern and central Illinois and in the Metro‐East area around
St. Louis. Ryan did better than Republicans usually do in Cook County and in Chicago, and the
organization Democrats in Chicago never did entirely embrace the Poshard campaign. Ryan also
ran extremely well in the five suburban Collar Counties.
The 1998 Illinois Attorney General race was between Jim Ryan who was the State’s
Attorney in DuPage County, the state’s largest Republican stronghold, and Miram Santos, who
was the Circuit Clerk in Cook County, the state’s largest Democratic stronghold. Santos had
strong support in the state’s growing Hispanic community. Initially, this contest might have
seemed like an even match; however, the Santos campaign never seemed to get on track, and
she proved to be a less than effective campaigner while Jim Ryan was a very effective
candidate. Ultimately Ryan won a landslide over Santos with a 61 percent to 38 percent
margin. Santos won Cook County by a margin of 55,513 votes which is not enough for a
Democrat to win statewide. Jim Ryan, as expected ran extremely well in the five suburban
Collar Counties of DuPage, Will, Kane, Mchenry, and Lake Counties where Republicans had
traditionally won large majorities in statewide races. Santos lost all the Downstate counties
except for three traditionally Democratic counties (Gallatin, Franklin, and Alexander) in deep
southern Illinois. Ryan won the other 98 counties, and his victory showed what a Republican
landslide would look like. Santos’ meager results showed where the absolute Democratic
bedrock was fixed in Illinois at that time (Jackson, 2003).
The 2002 elections brought an almost entirely new cast of characters and quite different
results for both parties. George Ryan’s Administration had been a controversial and troubled
one, and his prospects for re‐election were so bad that he dropped out of running for a second
term fairly early in the year before the election was held. Ryan was subjected to a storm of
criticism from Democrats and the mass media because of a hiring scandal and other patronage
abuses which had actually started when he was Secretary of State and which Glenn Poshard
had firmly criticized during his run for the Governorship in 1998. Poshard had tried to make
those abuses an issue during his 1998 run for Governor; however, the media were not
particularly interested at that time, and Ryan was able to divert attention to other subjects
during that race. Investigation of those abuses was taken over by a new United States Attorney
for the northern District of Illinois, Patrick Fitzgerald, and his investigations plus stories of the
scandal were a constant backdrop to the 2002 governor’s race. Other prominent Republicans
in the Illinois General Assembly were caught up in one facet or another of the Ryan scandals.
Ryan also angered many of his Republican peers by commuting the sentences of all the inmates
on death row in Illinois, and he was far too much of a tax and spend politician to suit the
conservative wing of the Republican Party. Thus, the 2002 prospects for the Republicans
statewide did not look nearly as promising as they had in 1998. However, in the 2002 Illinois
Republican Primary the party nominated their incumbent Attorney General, Jim Ryan, after a
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spirited contest with two major challengers, the incumbent Lieutenant Governor, Corinne
Wood, and a very outspoken State Senator, Patrick O’Malley, who had the support of the
Republican Party’s very conservative wing. Ryan had a good record as Attorney General, and he
appeared to be the most competitive candidate the Republicans could have run that year. Ryan
was faced by a Democrat from Chicago, Rod Blagojevich, who had been a three term
Congressman from the north side, and Blagojevich had been a state representative before then.
Blagojevich was also supported by one of the Chicago powerbrokers, Richard Mell, who was his
father‐in‐law, and the assumption was that Mell could produce strong Chicago organization
support for Blagojevich. Blagojevich won a competitive primary against Paul Vallas, who had
been the Chicago Public Schools Superintendent under Major Richard M. Daley, and Roland
Burris, who had earlier served two terms as Comptroller and then one term as Illinois Attorney
General. Blagojevich’s competitive primary seemed not to leave lasting intra‐party scars since
the Democrats were intent on taking back the Governor’s office after twenty six consecutive
years of being shut out of it. Ryan had more trouble unifying the Republican Party after their
own divisive primary. Blagojevich ultimately beat Jim Ryan by a healthy margin, 52 percent to
45 percent. The Republican candidate never seemed to get his campaign on track. Many
attributed his problems to the fact that his last name was the same as George Ryan although
the two were not related; however, the problems probably ran much deeper than that with the
George Ryan scandals beginning to take hold in the public’s consciousness and the internal
divisions of the Republican Party never healed after the divisive primary that spring (Green,
2003). Blagojevich proved to be a strong campaigner, and his campaign became a textbook
example of how a Democrat can win in Illinois. He ran extremely well in Chicago where he piled
up a margin of more than 400,000 vote plurality and in Cook County, where he won by a 50,000
plus margin. Blagojevich did well enough in the suburbs and downstate especially in the
Democratic strongholds in the Metro‐East area of suburban St. Louis and in the traditional deep
south Democratic counties of Randolph, Jackson, Franklin, Saline, Gallatin, and Alexander
counties. Blagojevich also did well in the northwest in Rock Island County and in LaSalle County
and in several western Illinois counties (Jackson, 2003; Green, 2003).
Blagojevich’s 2002 victory set the standard for modern Democratic candidates and
showed clearly what the components of a Democratic majority statewide would look like. His
success was almost matched by another Democratic newcomer to the statewide scene, Lisa
Madigan, who won the race for Attorney General. Madigan was a young State Senator who
had previously worked on the staff of the late United States Senator, Paul Simon. Madigan was
also well connected politically by virtue of being the daughter of the current Speaker of the
House, Mike Madigan, who was also the State Chair of the Democratic Party and a major player
in Illinois politics for three decades. In fact, the only real rap on Madigan was that she was
young and inexperienced in the practice of law and she appeared to have fewer legal
credentials than those ordinarily judged to be viable candidates for Attorney General. Madigan
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was faced by Joe Birkett who at that time was the State’s Attorney in DuPage County. Note
that this is the same office to which Jim Ryan had been elected previously in 1994 and 1998 in
the Republican suburban fortress of DuPage County. Birkett ran an intelligent and competitive
race where he concentrated fire on Madigan’s inexperience and lack of traditional legal
credentials. Birkett was also helped by a Republican Party which though divided on other
matters seemed to be united in their desire to elect Birkett and defeat Madigan. Madigan
made up in good judgment, campaign enthusiasm, and basic political acumen what she may
have lacked in experience and legal qualifications. Madigan ultimately defeated Birkett in a
very hard fought and close election by the statewide margin of 50.39 percent to 47.10 percent.
(A third party candidate, Gary Shilts the Libertarian, got 2.51 percent). (Illinois State Board of
Elections, November, 2002). The Madigan versus Birkett race for Attorney General in 2002
shows the contours of what a very competitive race in Illinois is likely to look like in the first
decade of the 21st century. Madigan beat Birkett by a wide margin of 182,554 votes, or by 76
percent to 21 percent in Chicago. She also beat Birkett by 40,000 votes, or a narrow 50 percent
to 47 percent in suburban Cook County (Jackson, 2004; Green, 2003). Madigan did better than
Blagojevich did in Chicago and she almost equaled him in suburban Cook County. Birkett won
his home county of DuPage by a margin of almost 95,000 votes and he took the other four
suburban Collar Counties narrowly. Madigan won almost the same counties downstate as
Blagojevich did‐ except for twelve counties where the two Democrats had split results. This
was a very competitive race statewide which the Democrats ultimately won, by a fairly narrow
margin, and it illustrates very succinctly where the two parties have been strong traditionally in
Illinois, and where the toss‐up counties, or the counties where either party can prevail, are
located.
Overall, the victories of Rod Blagojevich for Governor and Lisa Madigan as Attorney
General in 2002, along with the victory of the Democrats in the other constitutional offices
(Secretary of State and Comptroller), coupled with the victory of the Democrats in a majority of
the House and Senate races that year, helped to propel the recent successes the Democrats
have enjoyed in the first decade of the 21st Century. After the 2002 campaign, the Republicans
were reduced to holding only one statewide office, Treasurer, and they held one federal office,
the Junior Senator, Peter Fitzgerald, which they then lost in 2004 when Barack Obama beat the
Republican candidate, Alan Keyes (Jackson, 2006). Coupled with a Democratic majority of 10 to
9 of the U. S. House seats after 2004, and holding both U. S. Senate seats after 2004, was the
fact that the Democrats had won the presidential contest in Illinois in every national election
since 1992. This string of victories for the Democrats in both federal and state elections was
extended in 2006 by even wider margins. The results of the 2006 elections in Illinois solidified
and confirmed what has been a rapidly developing trend for at least a decade. Illinois became
one of the bluest of the blue states in that election cycle. Illinois Democrats won all the
statewide races, taking control or retaining control of all the constitutional offices, including
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State Treasurer, which the Republicans had held with Judy Barr Topinka since 1995, taking an
even larger majority in the Illinois Senate, and holding onto their majority in the Illinois House.
Dick Durbin held the Senior Senator from Illinois seat, and he became the Assistant Minority
leader in the U. S. Senate in 2005 and the Assistant Majority Leader in 2007. Senator Barack
Obama became a rising star in national politics, and he became a leading presidential candidate
soon after the 2006 national elections. 2006 firmly solidified the lead the Democrats enjoyed in
the state , and it seemed to indicate that the tide was running in their favor in Illinois.
The general election in November of 2006 confirmed all the trends toward the
Democratic Party which had been running since 2002 and even before in Illinois as was noted
above. We are focusing in this paper on the two high profile races for Governor and Attorney
General. The Democrats won both handily. Rod Blagojevich won the Governorship by a very
comfortable margin. He took 49.9 percent of the vote to 39.7 percent for his Republican
opponent, State Treasurer Judy Barr Topinka a spread of more than 10 percent (Illinois State
Board of Elections, November, 2006). Blagojevich was prevented from obtaining an outright
majority by the unusually strong results for the Green Party candidate, Richard Whitney of
Carbondale, who obtained 10.4 percent which was an historic level for a third party in Illinois.
The Whitney vote was partially a protest vote or “none of the above” verdict on both
candidates. Blagojevich carried his hometown of Chicago with an overwhelming margin of 77
percent of the vote. He carried suburban Cook County with a 100,000 vote margin (Illinois
State Board of Elections, November, 2006; Green, February, 2007). Blagojevich also carried 29
downstate counties. More importantly, he did better than Democrats usually do with an
outright victory in two suburban Collar Counties, Will and Lake, and he ran better than
Democrats usually run in the other three Collar Counties. It is also clear that the Democrats did
extremely well in all the other constitutional officer races and in the marginal districts
contested for the General Assembly.
Overall 2006 was a very good year for the Democrats in Illinois. Nowhere is the current
dominance of the Democratic Party more evident than in the Attorney General’s race. In 2006
Lisa Madigan was running for her second term. She was overwhelmingly re‐elected with a
margin of 72.45 percent to 24.45 percent over her Republican opponent, Stewart Umholtz. It is
worth emphasizing that this Democratic landslide for Lisa Madigan for Attorney General was
attained only four years after her very close and competitive race in 2002 and only eight years
after the Democratic candidate, Marie Santos had lost all but four counties in her race for
Attorney General in 1998. In fact Madigan’s Republican opponent, Stewart Umholtz, was
largely unknown before the 2006 general election, and he remained that way after the election.
He raised and spent very little money for a statewide race, and he had virtually no television,
and very little presence in any of the counties other than the advantages provided by being a
part of the Republican state ticket. The fact that he carried only two counties (Edwards and
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Tazewell) is indicative of just how overwhelming Madigan’s landslide was and how much this
race resembled the 1996 Ryan vs. Santos result in reverse. We will now examine the historic
areas of strength and weakness for both parties across all of these races.

The County Level Data Analysis
In this segment of the paper we turn to the analysis of the results of the 1998, 2002, and
2006 races. We will examine these results to demonstrate the geographical base of the two
major parties and to show where they have done well, and not so well, over the last three
election cycles. These three cycles include the time period from George Ryan’s victory over
Glenn Poshard in the 1998 Governor’s race to Rod Blagojevich’s re‐election over Judy Barr
Topinka in 2006. At the Attorney General’s level it included the period from the landslide
victory of Republican Jim Ryan over Democrat Miram Santos in 1998 to the landslide victory of
Democrat Lisa Madigan over Republican Stewart Umholtz in 2006. In between there was a close
and competitive race for Attorney General which featured Lisa Madigan and Joe Birkett in 2002.
Thus, we have covered an electoral period in Illinois politics where the Republicans went from
winning both the Governor’s race and the Attorney General’s race to just the opposite just
eight years later. 2002 was a very competitive election and the Republicans were competitive
for both the Governor and the Attorney General’s offices that year; however, they ultimately
lost both races. One might well term 2002 the “tipping point” in Illinois politics when Illinois
went from being a highly competitive two party state to one when Illinois is commonly
regarded as one of the most dependable blue states and where many observers are now
wondering aloud about the ability of the Illinois Republicans to continue to compete in
statewide races (Green, 2007). It is the study of that potential for continued competitiveness of
the two parties, and especially the future of the Republicans, which is the central research
question of this paper.
It matters significantly where people live and where they work in the analysis of partisan
politics in the United States. People tend to live, work, and recreate in largely homogeneous
places. They tend to join compatible voluntary organizations such as civic groups, fraternal
organizations, churches and synagogues and neighborhood groups and associate mostly with
like‐minded people. They tend especially to live in homogeneous places surrounded by people
that are much like themselves whose lifestyles and views reinforce their own values and
prejudices (Brooks, 2004). This homogeneous clustering tendency is particularly driven by
economics and the market place, especially the cost of housing. Market forces are reinforced by
considerations of race and ethnicity and the quality of schools in many areas. Thus
Republicans wind up congregating with other Republicans and Democrats with other
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Democrats. An analysis of the election returns based on a study of the maps at the county level
can reveal much about the current status and the future prospects of the two parties.
(Map 1 here)
Map 1 provides the graphic demonstration of where Governor Blagojevich did well in his
re‐election race with Judy Barr Topinka, and where she was able to win county level victories in
2006. Overall, of course, Blagojevich did extremely well statewide with a 49.8 percent to 39.3
percent victory over Topinka. Richard Whitney, the Green Party candidate, received 10.4
percent of the votes which is unusually high for a third party candidate in Illinois. Whitney’s
strong showing undoubtedly prevented the incumbent governor from receiving a clear
majority, and Whitney’s total vote also probably indicated some significant dissatisfaction with
both candidates of the major parties. Nevertheless, the Governor and his allies could clearly
take comfort in his 10.5 percent margin over his Republican opponent, and many Republicans
expressed considerable alarm over the future of their party in light of the fact that their
candidate for Governor received less than 40 percent of the statewide vote. As was noted
earlier, the Republicans lost all of the statewide constitutional officer races in 2006, and they
also lost ground in the Illinois Senate where the Democrats elected a veto proof majority.
All in all, 2006 was a very bad year for Republicans in Illinois and a very good year for the
Democrats; however, it is worthwhile to get beyond the state‐wide totals and to examine in
some detail where both parties prospered and where they may have cause for concern for the
future. Map 1 provides the visual results making it very easy to see the answers to that
question. First it is notable that Blagojevich won a total of 32 counties and Topinka won the
remainder, or 70 counties. If geography won elections, and at the presidential level, to a
considerable extent it does because of design of the electoral college, then Topinka would have
been Governor (Jacobson, 2005). However, of course, it is ultimately total votes and people,
not land which counts the most in the races below the presidency. Blagojevich won big in the
big counties. That is, he won handily in Cook County which is the biggest and most important of
all. He won Cook County by over half a million votes. He even won two of the five suburban
Collar Counties, i.e. Will and Lake County. These are not counties that Democratic candidates
for Governor traditionally win. Their loss by Topinka may well signal some very significant long
term problems for the viability of the Republican Party (Green, 2007). The Governor also won
Winnebago, Rock Island, LaSalle, St. Clair, and Madison Counties. With the possible exception of
Winnebago, the Democrats usually do well in those counties; however, these results spell
continuing trouble for the Republicans in some of the bigger and more urban counties. In deep
southern Illinois, Blagojevich won the traditional Democratic Counties of Franklin, Gallatin,
Randolph, Union and Alexander, which an incumbent Democrat should expect to win; however,
he also picked up Williamson County, which is not a traditionally Democratic stronghold in
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Governor’s races. On the other hand, all was not completely lost for Topinka and the
Republicans. She won a wide swath of counties across central Illinois stretching from the
Mississippi River on the west to Indiana on the east. She also won a significant number of
northern Illinois counties, and three of the five Collar Counties where Republicans traditionally
dominate. In deep southern Illinois, Topinka took the usual Republican strongholds of Clinton,
Washington, and Johnson Counties. She added Jackson County which is not typically a
Republican County. The Topinka victory in Jackson County undoubtedly resulted from the
unusually large total obtained by Carbondale attorney Rich Whitney, and it was indicative of
some dissatisfaction with Blagojevich in a traditionally Democratic county. The day after the
November, 2006 elections the Democrats had much to celebrate and the Republicans much to
despair over looking at only this one set of returns. (See also Appendix A for the population
data on each of the counties in each camp).
(Map 2 here)
Map 2 helps to put these results into a more long‐term perspective. It includes the
results from the 2002 governor’s race for a longitudinal perspective. Blagojevich won his first
term in 2002 by beating Jim Ryan in a race which was much closer than the 2006 race. Map 2
provides data addressing the question of where the Democrats have done well consistently and
where the Republicans have consistently won recently. This map also provides the evidence
necessary to make some calculations as to where the “toss up” or swing counties are located.
In other words, which are the counties where the candidates for each party can have a
reasonable expectation of winning. Such winning candidates can be expected to appeal to the
issues, ideologies, and candidate images of the day, and on basis of what the voting behavior
literature calls the “short term” factors, can have a chance of overcoming the built in influence
of the long term commitment many people have to party identification and to voting for the
party they are loyal to and typically support (Niemi and Wiesberg, 1993). While aggregate data
cannot settle these questions definitively, voting returns at the county level can be very useful
in showing the geographic areas where each party can expect to do well, to lose, and to have a
chance to win with the right candidate, appealing issues, and an effective campaign. Map 2
provides a slice of recent Illinois electoral history.
Map 2 gives a perspective which could provide some comfort for Republicans. There is
a total of 24 counties which Blagojevich won in both 2002 and 2004. Of course, the fact that
Cook County is one of those is by far the most important longitudinal trend in the mix. In
addition, the Democrats picked up 8 counties in 2006 which they had not won in 2002.
Included here are Will, Lake, and Boone counties in northern Illinois, and Monroe County in the
St. Louis Metro‐East area, plus Williamson County in southern Illinois‐ all bad news for the
Republicans. On the more positive side of the ledger for the Republicans is the fact that there
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are 60 counties, mostly in central and northern Illinois which voted for Ryan in 2002 and for
Topinka in 2006. This is the bedrock of the Republican Party in Illinois. The consistency of
these results indicates that the candidates can come and go, the issues change, the party can
even be shaken by scandal, all of which happened between 2002 and 2006, and these areas will
be loyal to the Republican tradition of their ancestors. These 60 counties are the very red
counties in a state that is deeply blue if you only look at the statewide returns. In addition,
although little noticed at the time, Topinka also picked up an additional 10 counties, mostly in
central Illinois, but including Jackson County and Marion County in southern Illinois, and
Lawrence County in eastern Illinois, which Ryan lost in 2002. Most notable here is a cluster of
“capital collar counties” just south of Springfield, (Sangamon County) including Macon,
Christian, Montgomery, Macoupin, and Green Counties, and including Mason and Cass
Counties northwest of Sangamon County. Obviously these are places where Republicans can
win given the right combination of candidates and circumstances. If added to the 60 counties
where the Republicans won in both 2002 and 2006, this totals 70 counties, out of 102, where
Judy Barr Topinka beat Rod Blagojevich in 2006 although she did not run a particularly effective
campaign, was outspent by a very large ratio, and had a national climate and a statewide
political environment which was toxic for Republican candidates in 2006.
Of course the county by county analysis, while useful, begs the question of the relative
size of the two parties’ foundations based on the size of the counties involved on both sides of
the ledger. Extending the analysis to the population size accomplishes that task. That analysis
reveals that the 32 counties carried by Blagojevich in 2006 comprised a total of 8,158,589
people. The 70 counties carried by Topinka in 2006 comprised a total of 4,260,704 people (U.
S. Census Data). So, the Blagojevich counties had almost twice as many people in them as the
Topika counties reflecting an urban versus rural split and a dichotomy which did not auger well
for the Republicans. Of course, of the 8.1 million in the Blagojevich column, Cook County and
Chicago accounted for over half, or 5.3 million of that total. Central city Chicago, alone had 23
percent of the state’s total population according to the 2000 census (U. S. Census Data). By
2004, Chicago had 19.7 percent of the total votes cast statewide, and this total had declined
from the 22.0 percent of the total in 1990 (Almanac of Illinois Politics, 2006). Suburban Cook
County outside Chicago had 20 percent of the state’s total population in 2000 and by 2004, it
had 19.2 percent of the total votes cast statewide. This contribution to the state’s total vote in
2004 was exactly the same as it had been in 1990 (Almanac of Illinois Politics, 2006). So, the
fact that the Democrats were actually doing better in both Chicago and suburban Cook County
in 2004 as compared to 1990 was clearly a positive indicator for them and a big problem for the
Republicans.
The Collar Counties around Chicago have long been the source of most of the total
population growth in the state of Illinois. This vast area includes the suburban counties of
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DuPage, Lake, Will, Kane, and McHenry, listed in descending order of their size. In the Census
of 2000 the Collar Counties had a total of 21 percent of the state’s population, and they had all
grown very significantly since the 1990 Census. In 1990 the five Collar Counties had 16.8
percent of the total votes cast statewide . This expanded rapidly to 23.2 percent of the
statewide total by 2004 thus indicating their rapid growth over that decade and a half period
(Almanac of Illinois Politics, 2006). The Collar Counties, especially DuPage County, became the
major foundation of the Republican Party’s statewide strength during the 1980s and 1990s.
Ordinarily growth in the Collar Counties could be taken as a sign of strength and vitality for the
Republicans and would be the harbinger of a bright future for the GOP. However, as we have
noted above, Blagojevich actually carried two of the collar counties, Lake and Will, in 2006, and
Democratic strength had been growing in some of the suburban areas for at least a decade
(Green, 2007). Even though Topinka herself was from suburban Chicago, she just did not run
nearly as well as a Republican has to run in the suburbs, in Cook and the five Collar Counties, to
be competitive in a statewide race. This leaves “Downstate” the other 96 counties for analysis.
Those 96 counties outside the metropolitan Chicago region once held the “balance of power” in
statewide races in Illinois (Colby and Green, 1986). In the U. S. Census of 2000 the 96
Downstate counties taken together had 36 percent of the state’s population (U. S. Census).
Their population had remained almost stable with only a 3.3 percent growth rate since 1990. In
1990 the Downstate counties held 42.0 percent of the state’s total vote. By 2004, this total had
declined to 37.9 percent of the total vote (Almanac of Illinois Politics, 2006). The 11 largest
Downstate counties had 17.5 percent of the state’s total vote in 1990, and an identical 17.5
percent of the total in 2004 thus indicating their stability in a dynamic population picture
overall. The other 85 counties Downstate had 24.5 percent of the state total in 1990 and only
20.4 percent of the total in 2004 (Almanac of Illinois Politics, 2006). This decline of over 4
percent, of course, indicates that Illinois like most Midwestern states is losing population in the
small towns and rural areas. If one focuses on the 11 largest counties outside metropolitan
Chicago, Topinka won 6 counties (Champaign, Macon, McClean, Peoria, Sangamon, and
Tazewell), and Blagojevich won 5 counties (LaSalle, Madison, Rock Island, St. Clair, and
Winnebago) in 2006. These results indicate a very competitive environment in those medium
sized and small cities outside the major urban and suburban areas of Chicagoland.
1998, 2002, and 2006 Results Compared
Map 3 provides the ultimate comparisons for the three elections and the eight years
between the 1998 and 2006 elections. This map contrasts those counties which were
Republican in all three governor’s races versus those which were Democratic in all three races.
This, of course, identifies those counties which form the core of the Republican coalition and
the core of the Democratic coalition, or the very red and the very blue counties. Then the map
identifies those counties which voted for the Democratic candidate for Governor in two of the
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Governor’s races, and thus might be termed the competitive, but “leans Democratic” counties.
Those counties can be contrasted with the other counties which voted for the Republican
candidate for Governor in two of the three races. These counties can be termed the
competitive, but “leans Republican” counties. In other words, both sets of these intermediate
counties can be regarded as the toss up counties where either side can win depending on the
appeal of an attractive candidate and the issues of that particular campaign. Perhaps we should
characterize these as the “purple counties” since they can go either way depending on the
short term factors of the race. (The information in the Figures in Appendix B provide a similar
assessment using only 1998 data compared to 2002 data for both the Governor’s race and the
Attorney General’s race).
(Map 3 here)
As we have come to expect, the reliably Democratic counties include Cook County plus
an additional group of other counties which cluster in the Metro‐East area around St. Louis and
in southern Illinois. These counties have historically been Democratic counties for many
generations and their history, culture, economic and demographic characteristics all help keep
them in the Democratic column. For example, the counties of deep southern Illinois have been
Democratic since the Civil War, and they were originally settled by people coming from the
South predominantly (Kenney and Brown, 1993). The counties on the east side of the
Mississippi River across from St. Louis, known as the “Metro‐East” region all partake of the
urban life and economy of St. Louis. In addition, several of them have had a tradition of strong
Democratic Party organizational strength, and the St. Clair County Democratic “machine” was
long a power house in that region. Cook County, is of course, the home of Chicago, and it
shares many of the characteristics of the great urban centers where the Democrats have
traditionally thrived. So, Democrats win in Illinois where Democrats usually win nationally in
the cities, and now increasingly in the close in suburban regions around the big cities. The
Republicans tend to win now in the suburbs which are farther out from the central cities and
which are now called “the exurbs”. Illinois Democrats have the added advantage of Illinois
including two large metropolitan regions in and around two large cities. They also have the
advantage of a large mostly rural and small town base in southern Illinois which has historically
been a Democratic Party strong hold. This history was reinforced by the economy of the region
where coal mining was once the backbone of the economy and where the labor union
movement was strong. That economic base has changed in southern Illinois. Coal no longer
provides a substantial number of jobs, and the United Mine Workers in this region has lost
many of its members. Some of the remaining mines and the newer mines are not even union
mines. Thus, the southern Illinois economy is being transformed into a largely service and
knowledge based economy just as is true in the rest of the nation. In this atmosphere the
Republicans have been doing better recently in southern Illinois, particularly in the legislative
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races. They usually base their appeals on being culturally conservative, and this strain of
campaign rhetoric is resonant with many voters in southern and some parts of central Illinois.
Such appeals have resulted in some notable Republican successes in southern and central
Illinois over the past decade; however, the Democratic Party still has the overall advantage
especially in statewide races. Coal used to be king in southern Illinois, and the labor unions
were one of the most important influences in the region and provided much of the muscle of
the Democratic party. With decline of coal, the United Mine Workers union has lost
membership and clout steadily and that has contributed to the problems of the Democratic
Party in the southern and central parts of the state. However, economic populism also still plays
well in southern Illinois, and when a candidate can make the case convincingly for jobs and for
social justice, they can usually win. This ordinarily means the Democrats win when the major
issues revolve around questions of job development and security and the economy.
In central and northern Illinois we find the bedrock of the Republican Party across these
three recent elections. That history of fidelity to the Republican Party goes all the way back in
Illinois history to the Civil War, and to the founding of the Republican Party nationally. This is,
after all, the Party of Lincoln, and Mr. Lincoln’s hometown of Springfield is one anchor of that
long time fidelity to the Republican Party (Kenney and Brown, 1993). Lincoln practiced law all
over central Illinois, and from there north the loyalties of the Civil War conflict were
predominantly with the union and with Lincoln. That Republican loyalty has remained intact
virtually every election since the Civil War. History and culture are reinforced by economics and
demographics. Much of the central and northern Illinois region is rich farmland, now
predominantly owned by large family farms, or increasingly by corporate farming. The land is
black and the people are predominantly white. There is not a great deal of diversity in many of
these counties. They are the typical places where the Republicans have done well for
generations nationally, and rural and small town Illinois is no exception to the national pattern.
The most important feature of the Illinois landscape outside Chicago is, however, the shape of
the suburban five counties around Cook County. That has been the region of the fastest growth
and the most economic dynamism in the state in all the years since World War II. Initially that
suburban growth fueled the growth and prosperity of the Republican Party statewide. In the
1980s and 1990s the suburban ring of counties around Chicago was the bedrock of the
Republican Party and they provided the margins necessary for Republican candidates to be
competitive in statewide elections (Colby and Green, 1986). Indeed, DuPage County was the
home of both Republican legislative leaders, Pate Phillip in the Senate and Lee Daniels in the
House, for much of the decade of the 1990s. However, by the 2002 election, this Republican
dominance was beginning to show some signs of strain (Neal, 2003; Green, 2007). At minimum
they were buffeted by the fall‐out from George Ryan’s term as Governor. That individual
specific problem can account for some of the immediate results in 2002; however, it is not the
major long term trend that will determine the fate of the two parties into the rest of the first
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decade of the 21st Century. Those trends seemed to favor the Democrats in some important
parts of the suburban Collar Counties. The Democrats were winning local races in places,
especially suburban Cook and Will and Lake Counties, where Democrats had not been
accustomed to winning. The close in suburbs were particularly increasing in diversity and in
attracting the demographic groups which traditionally vote Democratic. Others were attracting
the kinds of voters who are Independent but who are socially liberal, or libertarian, while being
more conservative on the fiscal issues. Democratic candidates could appeal to such voters, and
they did so with increasing success in 2002 and 2006. Table 1 provides U. S. Census Bureau data
on the racial and ethnic diversity of Cook and the Collar Counties. The data in this table indicate
quite clearly how large the Hispanic, Black and other ethnic minorities have grown to be in the
state’s major city and in the suburban areas which surround it. It particularly highlights the
growing Hispanic population.
(Table 1)
By 2006 the Democrats owned all the statewide offices and they also controlled a
majority in both houses of the General Assembly. As we noted earlier, many experts were
calling Illinois a “dark blue” state and were speculating about the very negative prospects faced
by the Republicans in Illinois (Green, 2007). This paper is an attempt to bring some empirical
data to some of those long term trend observations.
There is a related national dialogue regarding the future of both parties. If Illinois is
indeed the most representative, or the “most average” of American states, then a close analysis
of Illinois voting patterns may help bring empirical data to that debate (Ohlemacher, 2007). One
school of thought, initially authored by Kevin Phillips, predicted that the long term forces in the
nation favored the Republican Party (Phillips, 1969). Phillips predicted a conservative‐
Republican realignment based on the realignment of the white south into the Republican
column, and of course, much of that came true in the subsequent three decades. It is also clear
that President George W. Bush, and his major political strategist, Karl Rove, wanted to
stimulate a national realignment and a permanent Republican and conservative majority based
on the president’s policies, especially his advantages in the war on terror. The opposite trend
was enunciated by political scientists, Judis and Teixeria in a 2002 book which predicted a
realignment which would favor the Democrats in the long run (2002). Their predictions were
based on the idea that the demographic trends and the economic trends, especially in a
knowledge and service based economy, would favor the Democrats. They maintained that the
“ideopolis”, i.e. the urban and suburban areas were increasingly filled by people who were well
educated, who were working in a global economy, and who were increasingly liberal and
libertarian in social values. Such people, according to Judis and Teixeria, were very unlikely to
be attracted to the religious fundamentalism that was the dominant wing of the Republican
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Party. Thus, the Democrats had a golden opportunity to ensure their long‐term dominance as
the majority party if they could appeal to these voters. Some of that Judis and Teixeria
argument is the more theoretical impetus for this paper which provides an empirical test of
their propositions for the state of Illinois.
In order to test more directly some of the implications of the realignment thesis and the
arguments about whether long‐term trends favor the Republican Party or the Democratic Party,
we examined some of the demographic data underlying our county based analysis. First, we
looked at the population base of the reliably Democratic counties, the reliably Republican
counties, and the toss up counties. The data comparing the population of the counties in 1990
to 2000, and presenting the rate of growth of each of the counties are presented in Table 2.
(Table 2)
Illinois grew from approximately 11.4 million to just over 12.4 million in the ten years
between 1990 and 2000 (U. S. Census, City County Data Book: 2000, 27). This was a growth rate
of 8.6 per cent overall. While this was a respectable rate, it fell just short of the threshold
necessary for Illinois to keep all its representation in the U. S. House so the total delegation was
reduced from 20 to 19 after the census. To illustrate how competitive Illinois has been, the 20
representatives had been divided evenly at 10 to 10 during the decade of the 1990s. After the
reapportionment, the Democrats lost one seat in southern Illinois, and the overall state
delegation changed to 10 Republicans versus 9 Democrats after the 2002 elections. Then in
2004 the Democrats defeated one incumbent in northeastern Illinois, and the delegation
balance shifted to 10 Democrats and 9 Republicans. This is where it has remained since 2004.
That indicates a statewide distribution that is competitive but leaning toward the Democrats
by a slight margin.
Table 2 provides some encouragement for those interested in the Republican Party in
Illinois and their potential for regaining competitiveness. Table 2 shows that those 43 solidly
Republican counties had a total population of 3, 544, 148 in 2000, and that combination of
counties grew from 28 percent of the state’s total population in 1990 to 29 percent in 2000. It
also shows that in those 43 counties where the Republicans won the Governor’s race all three
years, i.e. 1998, 2002, and 2006, the population growth rate constituted 37 percent of the
state’s total increase of 988, 691 over the past decade. In other words, a Republican in a
statewide race can start the race with a solid and fairly dependable population base that
included almost one‐third of the state’s total population. In addition, some of the fastest
growing counties in terms of percentage growth were also the loyal Republican counties. This
does not mean that all the new residents in these counties will be or will become Republicans.
Some will, while others will be Independents or from groups, e.g. African‐Americans, some
Hispanics, union members and blue collar workers who are usually associated with the
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Democratic Party. It does mean, however, that the political culture, the power arrangements,
and the peer group climate are more likely to favor the Republicans in these counties where
their core strength is located, and those are important long‐term considerations. In addition,
Table 2 also shows that in the next category, i.e. those 26 counties where the Republicans won
two and the Democrats won only one Governor’s race out of the three accounted for 13
percent of the state’s total population in 2000. In addition, this group increased from 12
percent of the state’s total population or accounted for 31 percent of the total growth in the
state in the previous decade. These would have to be classified as the “leaning Republican
Counties” where a Democrat can only win under the right circumstances or where only a
particularly attractive Democratic candidate can win. When the “solidly Republican Counties”
are combined with the “leans Republican”, a statewide Republican candidate then starts with a
clear partisan advantage in counties accounting for a total of 42 percent of the state’s total
population. That total will not guarantee a victory by any stretch; however, it is a very firm
foundation on which to build toward a majority, and it is a foundation which most Republican
candidates can depend on.
We turn now to the same consideration of the prospective Democratic candidate’s
statewide base. Those 15 counties where the Democrats won the Governor’s race two out of
three times, the “leans Democratic” counties accounted for only 8 percent of the state’s total
population in 2000 and this was down from 9 percent in 1990. This very slow growth rate
amounted to 4 percent of the state’s total growth in the 1990s. Finally, the 18 counties where
the Democrats won all three races for Governor during this period accounted for a total of 50
percent of the state’s total population in the year 2000. This is the core of the Democratic
Party’s strength in Illinois and is a dramatic indication of why and how the Democrats start with
such an initial advantage in statewide races and why the state as a whole has been called
recently a “deep blue” state (Green, 2007). When put together with the “leans Democratic”
counties, one has a total of 58 percent of the state’s total population, certainly giving the
Democratic candidates an overall strategic advantage in many state races. In addition, women
voters are becoming increasingly important to both parties and the gender gap, especially
among urban and suburban women has favored the Democrats recently.
In spite of these very positive indicators for the Democrats, there are also some signs
of problems and potential trouble for the Democrats. Table 2 shows that the solid Democratic
counties dropped from 52 percent of the state’s total population in 1990 to 50 percent of the
state’s total in 2000. In addition, the solid Democratic counties represented only 29 percent of
the state’s total growth and the “leans Democratic” counties only 3.8 percent of the state’s
growth over the decade between 1990 and 2000. In short, two‐thirds (or 68 percent total) of
the growth in Illinois in that decade was in the traditionally Republican counties, or in the
counties which lean consistently toward the Republicans. This left less than one‐third of the
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growth in the counties that form the Democratic Party’s base, or that leaned Democratic during
this era.
Conclusion
The line‐up of offices currently held provides a comforting picture for Democratic strategists
and should raise alarms for Republican strategists. However, any Democratic official inclined to
bask in past glory and to take their current success as a guarantee of what the future may bring
would do well to study these demographic results carefully. The Democrats must continue to
try to win in the dynamic and fast growth counties where the Republicans have traditionally
had an advantage. Relying on their base alone is a ticket to stagnation and decline. Of course,
this also means that the Republicans must fight for Independents and cross‐over voters in the
same diverse, fast‐growing and dynamic counties. This has traditionally meant appealing to the
suburbs first and foremost for the Republicans in Illinois. As Paul Green of Roosevelt University
has consistently shown in recent elections, the Republicans have failed significantly in their
quest to hold onto what had been their traditional advantages in the suburbs (Green, February
2007; Green, 2003). As the suburbs have become more diverse, the Democrats have gained and
the Republicans have lost strength where the GOP used to be dominant. Indeed, Republican
losses in suburban Cook and in the Collar Counties recently have been keys to the Republican
decline. Demographics may not be destiny, but demographic trends certainly create the
important parameters within which parties and candidates must shape their destinies.
Governor Blagojevich’s victory in Will and Lake Counties, and the size of his margin in Cook
were important elements of his rather convincing ten point victory statewide over Topinka in
2006. Also, Lisa Madigan’s overwhelming statewide victory in the Attorney General’s race in
2006 was fashioned in part by an unusually strong showing in the Collar Counties for a
Democrat. All these are very positive signs for the Democrats in the short‐term; however, the
data on long term population growth trends in the loyal base of the two parties are much more
positive for the Republicans. Neither party, of course, can afford to take much for granted in a
highly competitive and fluid environment like Illinois. The point is that Illinois is still a highly
competitive state where either party can win depending on the short term factors of candidate
image, the compelling issues at the time, and the quality of the campaign mounted by the
candidates of both parties. Candidates and campaigns, the issues they raise, the records they
present, and their fit with the larger forces and narratives dominant in public opinion at the
time still count for much that is dynamic and always changing in American politics. Illinois is no
exception to the rule despite its recent designation as one of the bluest of the blue states.
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Table 1
Racial and Ethnic Diversity in Cook and Collar Counties

County

Black/
Af. Am.

Asian

Other
Races

Cook

1,405,361

260,170

531,170

DuPage

27,600

71,252

28,166

15,482

81,366

9.0

Kane

23,279

7,296

42,870

8,935

95,924

23.7

Lake

44,741

25,105

43,283

12,929

92,716

14.4

McHenry

1,523

3,782

7,211

2,821

19,602

7.5

Will

52,509

11,125

18,219

8,186

43,768

8.7

2+
Hispanic % Hispanic
Races

136,223 1,071,740

19.9%

Source: U. S. Census Bureau, County and City Data Book: 2000. pp. 27‐28; 75‐76.
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Map 1
2006 Illinois Governor Election

% of Vote
Blagojevich

49.8

Topinka

39.3

Whitney

10.4

Source: Illinois State Board of Elections
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Map 2
2002 and 2006 Illinois Governor Election

Blagojevich wins in both 2002 and 2006
Blagojevich gains in 2006
Blagojevich loses in 2006
Republican wins in both 2002 and 2006
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Map 3
Illinois Governor Elections 1998 through 2006

Republican in all three elections
Democrat in all three elections
Democrat in 2 elections
Democrat in 1 election
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